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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EXCLUSIONARY RULE NOT
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO ILLEGAL SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES ON COLLATERAL ATTACK
Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
Petitioner was convicted in a Louisiana district court on May 28,
1959, of "simple burglary" based on evidence ultimately held by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to have been illegally seized from his
home and place of business. Following affirmance of the conviction
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in February 1960,1 the United
States Supreme Court on June 19, 1961, announced its decision in
Mapp v. Ohio,2 holding that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment
was required of the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Immediately thereafter petitioner filed an application for
habeas corpus in a Louisiana state court on the basis of the Mapp decision. Upon denial of relief in the Louisiana courts, he filed a like
application in a United States district court. His petition was denied
and on appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 3 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, HELD, the rule of Mapp v. Ohio does not operate retroactively upon cases finally decided prior to that decision.
Judgment affirmed, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.
The Mapp decision solved a troublesome problem concerning the
applicability of the Weeks4 exclusionary rule to the states. At the
same time it raised an equally troublesome problem with regard to
the effective administration of justice. The latter problem concerns
the extent to which a change in law, resulting from judicial reinterpretation, justifies the reopening of cases that have been finally decided without error on the basis of previously existing law. A very
pronounced split in the courts of appeals 5 and disagreement among
legal scholars prompted the Supreme Court's review of this question
in Linkletter.
Although the Court has usually remained silent on the subject,
the ordinary assumption has been that a decision construing the
Constitution must operate retroactively, even if an overruling decision.6 It is just such a principle of absolute retroactivity that pe1. State v. Linkletter, 239 La. 1000, 120 So. 2d 835 (La. 1960).
2. 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 828 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
4. Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 888 (1914).
5. See Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 1732 n.2 (1965).
6. Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
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titioner here sought to have reaffirmed. The Court apparently balked,
however, at the idea of abdicating its position of responsibility in our
system of judicial administration. In setting forth the authority and
rationale for its refusal to establish the rigid precedent sought by this
collateral attack, the Linkletter majority initially referred to the basic
jurisprudential controversy concerning the inherent capacity of courts
to engage in judicial lawmaking.- This clash of legal theories has been
renewed in practically every discussion involving the retroactivity of
judicial decisions, the net result being the demise of the Blackstonian
concept that law is unchanging and merely discovered by the courts.
In its place, the courts have generally accepted the view that law does
change and must continue to change. The principle of absolute retroactivity, greatly weakened by the gradual disintegration of its philosophical basis, received a more severe blow by the Court's recognition that no such automatic rule need be applied to prior final
judgments when collaterally attacked on the basis of a subsequent
ruling of invalidity." Prior to the Linkletter decision, such recognition was limited to the invalidity of statutes and the effect of decisions overturning long-established common law rules and had never
been applied to the constitutional area. Nevertheless, there appeared
to be no sound reason for denying its use in this area when the
exigencies of the situation warrant. 9 The Constitution offers neither
prohibition nor requirement in this respect.10
The majority in Linkletter follows this theory to its logical conclusion by formulating what it considers the proper criteria for resolving this newly recognized choice. The departure from a principle
of absolute retroactivity by no means forecloses the possibility of
retroactive application in every situation. The Court naturally recognizes that there are many situations in which reopening closed cases
as a result of evolutionary interpretation or reinterpretation of law is
not only appropriate, but may even be essential if justice is to be done.
It has been decided that a case pending final decision on direct appeal
should receive the retroactive benefit of the new rule.- The difficulty
comes with cases on collateral attack.
The Court in Linkletter emphasizes analysis of the purpose and
effect of a decision establishing a new rule of law and whether retroactive application would further or retard its operation.12 Policy
considerations as to the mechanics of applying the new rule, and the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1965).
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 1737 (1965).
Ibid.
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 1738 (1965).
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very nature of the vested rights claimed, also become important in this
determination.
Applying the above-mentioned analysis to the Mapp decision, the
Court in Linkletter was faced with the task of ascertaining the true
nature and purpose of the controversial exclusionary rule that Mapp
made applicable to the states. A close examination of the Mapp opinion suggests that exclusion, while not actually part of the fourth
13
Its purpose is seen to be that of
amendment, is necessitated by it.
deterrence - a means of enforcing the right to privacy as guaranteed
by the fourth amendment. 14 Thus, the exclusionary rule has been
held to be a rule of evidence of constitutional dimension, rather than"
5
a substantive right itself.
On the basis of the principles enunciated in Linkletter, the Supreme Court decided that the interests of justice would be better
served by restricting Mapp to prospective application.6 The Court
felt the deterrent purpose of the Mapp rule, by nature preventative
rather than curative, would not be furthered by retroactive application. They also believed the incidental purpose of Mapp, the amelioration of a very strained state-federal relationship, would not be
significantly furthered by such application. Another important factor
in the Court's determination was the tremendous burden that would
be placed on the judicial system by the retroactive operation of the
Mapp rule. It seemed unnecessary in the interest of justice to cause
serious disruption of the judicial process by applying to cases that
had reached final judgment 7 a procedural rule having little bearing on
the guilt of the accused.
Although the exclusionary rule is not itself a distinct substantive
right, Mapp has the effect of expanding the umbrella of Bill of Rights
protection over persons accused of crime. In this time of far-reaching
protection for the accused, Linkletter stands as a renewed awareness
of the Court's role in the administration of justice and its duty to
society as a whole. It is the first decision of the Supreme Court to
refuse retroactive application of a new Bill of Rights interpretation.18
An understanding of the basic distinction between Mapp and some
of the recent decisions applied retroactively is essential to grasping
the full impact of the Linkletter decision.
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15. See Commonwealth ex reL. Wilson v. Rundle,
143, 148 (1963).
16. 85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 1742 (1965).
17. Id. at 1734 n.5. The Court defined "final" as
ment of conviction was rendered, the availability of
time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our
18. Id. at 1746 (dissenting opinion).
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meaning: "where the judgappeal exhausted, and the
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Gideon v. Wainwright-9 involved an indigent's lack of counsel in
a state felony prosecution. Considerable doubt is raised as to the reliability of the guilt-determining process when a man is tried without
aid of counsel. For this reason, the Gideon principle has been applied
retroactively on collateral attack.2° In Griffin v. Illinois21 there was
also much doubt as to the complete reliability of the guilt-determining
process when the accused was unable to afford a transcript of record
and therefore unable to receive a complete adjudication of his case.
Similar suspicion arose in Jackson v. Denno22 in which a state criminal procedure left the factual determination as to the voluntariness
*of confession solely to the jury. Both Griffin and Jackson were applied to collateral attacks on judgments having previously become
final.23 An analysis of Mapp reveals that no such doubt is raised as
to the reliability of that judgment. The question in Mapp concerned the admissibility of tangible evidence, the reliability and relevancy of which were not affected by the method of acquisition. This
basic distinction appears fundamental to the principle enunciated in
Linkletter.
Linkletter's lasting significance will depend on its capacity to cope
with future controversies of this same order. Two very formidable
challenges are presented in the decisions of Escobedo v. Illinois24 and

Griffin v. California.25 The Linkletter principle has already been applied to both of these problems on the state level with amazingly
consistent results.26

Escobedo extended the Gideon principle to prearraignment interrogation and held inadmissible a confession obtained upon denial of
that right. It seems unlikely, however, that the problem of retroactivity or prospectivity as to the Escobedo decision will come before
the Supreme Court until many of the questions left unanswered by
that decision are adequately resolved. The scope of that decision is

19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. See Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelseimer v. Wainwright,
375 U.S. 2 (1963).
21. 357 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
23. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214 (1958) (Griffin retroactive). For application of Jackson v. Denno in collateral
attacks see McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575 (1964); Butler v. Rundle, 416 Pa. 321,
206 A.2d 283 (1965).
24. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
26. Holding Escobedo v. Illinois prospective: United States ex rel. Walden v.
Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa.
1965). Holding Griffin v. California prospective: Pinch v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d
212, 210 N.E.2d 883 (1965); In re Gaines, 404 P.2d 473, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965).
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anything but clear, particularly as to the point an investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry and begins to "focus" upon an individual.2 7
Although the Escobedo principle has been broadened to encompass
"non-request" situations,28 the general approach to the question of
its
application to collateral attacks has apparently been to limit the
decision to the facts presented.29 Thus limited, the most logical approach to the problem is to compare the rule adopted in Escobedo
with the two most diametrically opposed decisions included in the
Linkletter analysis - Mapp and Gideon. At first blush, it would appear that Gideon has the more comparable rule since Escobedo represents an extension of that decision. However, a thorough consideration of the new rule in light of the Linkletter principle has led the
vast majority of the courts considering the problem to restrict Escobedo to prospective application."o The fact that Gideon, Griffin v.
Illinois, and Jackson v. Denno were all products of collateral attacks
is considered by many courts3 as indicative of the Supreme Court's
intention to apply the rule retroactively, whereas the converse is true
with Escobedo and Mapp. Taking the conditions that prompted the
decision in Escobedo as indicative of the nature of the right sought to
be protected, it is commonly felt that Escobedo, unlike Gideon, does
not raise substantial doubt as to the reliability of the determination
of guilt.32 On the facts presented in Escobedo, in which the confession was essentially voluntary and the Court only hints at the
possibility of trickery by the police, 33 it may be reasoned that ignorance on the part of an accused as to his right to remain silent, or
even his right to counsel, does not in any way negate the fact that
the statement was voluntarily made. Similar to Mapp, the purpose
of the Escobedo principle has been seen to be that of deterrence.34
It is stressed in In re Lopez35 that the Escobedo rule did not emanate
from inherent unreliability of confessions or from the uncertainty
of the guilt of those who confessed, but rather it emerged from the
belief that secret interrogation was the source of coercion and that
27. See Comment, 17 U. FLA.

L. REv. 634, 637 (1965).
28. People v. Dorado, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964).
29. See In re Lopez, 398 P.2d 380, 40 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1964); State v. Johnson,
43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965).
30. United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965); In re Lopez, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965).
31. United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965); State
v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (N.J. 1965).
32. Cases cited note 30 siupra.
33. 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1964).
34. Cases cited note 29 supra.
35. 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965).
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the presence of counsel would destroy this source. In this light,
Escobedo appears more closely akin to Mapp than to Gideon.
If the scope of Escobedo is significantly broadened, however, the
opposite result might appear to be compelled by the Linkletter criteria. The rule of Escobedo might then take on a more fundamental
attitude, going to the very integrity of the guilt-determining process.
As noted in that decision itself, such interrogation could certainly
"affect the whole trial"36 or even reduce the trial to a mere formality.
Furthermore, the great number of confessions obtained during the
interrogation period points up its critical nature as a "stage when
legal aid and advice" is surely needed. 37 Thus, a broader interpretation of the Escobedo rule would require greater consideration of
its effect on the defendant's constitutional rights, especially in the
light of the difficulty of detecting coercion if it occurs and the
vagueness of the applicable standards for such determination.
Griffin v. California held that a California constitutional provision, 38 permitting comment on a defendant's failure to testify, violated the fifth amendment as made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.39 The problems that arise concerning
the application of Griffin to collateral attacks are very similar to
those discussed in relation to Escobedo. There is no clear indication
as to the nature of the right involved in the Griffin case. The majority's silence in this regard forces reliance on extrinsic authority
in the resolution of this question. Justice Harlan, concurring with
the majority's decision, agrees that such comment is barred by the
fifth amendment, but feels that it is a nonfundamental part of that
amendment.40 Other than the fact that he considers the decision compelled by the fifth amendment, Harlan's true allegiance is with the
dissent in its belief that the defendant is not unduly prejudiced by
the condemned procedure. The dissent takes it one step further in
contending that justice might be better served by the tendency of
such comment to control and limit discussion. However, the unbridled freedom of the prosecutor to elicit very damaging inferences
against the defendant for his silence is completely ignored. It may
be significant in this respect that the majority did realize the awesome impact that such court-approved comment would have on the
jury.
Despite the newness of the Griffin decision, this problem has
already received some attention in the state courts. The California
Supreme Court has denied invocation of the Griffin rule on col36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

378 U.S. 484, 486 (1964).
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
CAL. CONST.art I, §13.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
85 Sup. Ct. 1229, 1233 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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